Private relations were forbidden.
During unavoidable official contact, it was verboten to shake hands with Germans. At the same time the fruits of victory were enjoyed, both material and symbolic, and often in undifferentiated combination. In the office of the head of American Information Control, a flag with the swastika was draped over the sofa, and a luxury edition in folio of Mein Kampf served as the guest book the guests entered their names on the margins and empty spaces.
From her hairdresser "Madame Sibylle" she heard "many a secret of the ruling class under Hitler. There were enormous quantities of Manhattans and martinis, creme de menthe and old French cognac, Scotch whisky and the best French champagne. There was the best Russian caviar, there were oysters, there were enormous steaks. And for some fifty guests, with three servants engaged especially for the evening, and a bartender—the cook and maid were already there—all of this cost about ten dollars, that is, cigarettes in the amount of ten dollars.
At that time in Berlin, with dollars, you could live as though it were not a mound of rubble, not a defeated city, but a paradise" Curt Riess. Some found the behavior of the. Kennan said of it:. This was an establishment for which I had an almost neurotic distaste. I had been twice in Germany since the termination of hostilities. Each time I had come away with a sense of sheer horror at the spectacle of this horde of my compatriots and their dependents camping in luxury amid the ruins of a shattered national community, ignorant of the past, oblivious to the abundant evidences of present tragedy all around them, inhabiting the very same sequestered villas that the Gestapo and SS had just abandoned, and enjoying all the same privileges In addition to their material well-being, intellectuals in the cultural departments of the military administration had another reason to consider the occupation period in Berlin the "richest, most varied, and exciting" Spiel of their lives.
Young men less frequently women at the beginning of their professional careers who might never have never gotten beyond a midlevel position now found themselves in positions of power that Balzac's young heroes could only dream of. They became founders of newspapers instead of tolling away as editors, issued publishing licenses in lieu of merely reading manuscripts.
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Berlin's cultural industry seemed to them a giant toy, or a new version of the Roman saturnalia. The old hierarchy was suspended. So much for the archaism—or, more correctly, the archaic appearance—of the cultural occupation of Berlin. For what appeared as a recourse to antique and colonial practices of handling the defeated was in reality something new. In the past, military occupation of defeated nations had limited itself to physical control. The thought and culture of the occupied people were left untouched.
Censorship measures ensued only to protect the military and political interests of the occupying power. Out of the psychological-warfare techniques developed during the war to demoralize the enemy emerged a postwar strategy of remoralization toward the ethical and political values of the victor. Like everything new, this had its predecessors as well. The most immediate were Germany's cultural policies in occupied Paris from to , which for their part drew upon the experiences of the German occupation of Belgium from to The Central Press Office of the Political Division of the General Government in Belgium, established in Brussels in , might be called the first information control department of modern military history.
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Its sphere was partly traditional—censorship—and partly modern—propaganda. It did, however, fall short of the direct intervention into native cultural institutions and the media that occurred in Germany after The Brussels department's importance showed in the choice of its personnel. The most important tool, founded for this purpose, was the German Institute. What its leader, Karl Epting, said in December about the institute's objectives shows that a distinction between propaganda and reeducation was still discernible, though evaporating more and more. They must no longer speak in the name of general principles and should no longer try to spread these principles beyond France's borders.
Nazi ideologues in Berlin like Goebbels and Rosenberg attempted a Nazi re-education of the French intelligentsia. More moderate circles were satisfied with the idea that the French intelligentsia were simply being denied the further export of their views.
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In German-occupied Paris there was in fact no noteworthy attempt at Nazi reeducation, because those who would have had to carry it out were not disposed to do so. The German cultural officers were in the main Francophiles of the educated middle class, characterized by what one of them Gerhard Heller once confessed: "For us, Paris was a second intellectual fatherland, the most complete embodiment of everything we sought to preserve of the culture of the past.
The cautious maneuvering of the cultural officers played an important part.
The French, moving into their assigned sector of Berlin in the late summer of , found it difficult to play the role of victor convincingly. The trauma of the defeat in and subsequent occupation and collaboration was still fresh, and their self-assurance was undercut by the memory that the Germans, now to be ruled and overseen, had less than a year before been the rulers in their own land.
How little France counted in the circle of victorious powers had been made clear when the areas of occupation were first laid out. No thought had been given to a French zone. The fact that the French zone in western Germany and the French sector in Berlin were taken from the area originally intended for the British must have been seen in Paris as the granting of crumbs from the table of the mighty.
And in the end, for the nation that for centuries had considered itself the cultural leader of Europe and the entire world, it was sheer humiliation to be assigned a sector in Berlin composed of two districts that were a cultural wasteland. In Reinickendorf and Wedding there was to be found no theater, no opera house, no museum, no publisher of note, no university, and, beyond a few public-library branches, no library worthy of the name. In view of these circumstances it is not surprising that the tone of the French occupation was subdued and full of resentment. The American correspondent Delbert Clark, himself anything but warmly disposed toward Germans, considered French occupation politics paranoid and petty, emanating from an "atmosphere of diseased pragmatism"—"like the behaviour of a squirrel on a treadmill: so long as he keeps it revolving he fancies he is going somewhere.
The lack of cultural infrastructure in the French sector made it impossible for the French to institute cultural policies as the other Allies were doing. Restriction to cinemas, schools, and public libraries did not satisfy French claims on culture; and the only voice that carried beyond their sector, the daily newspaper Der Kurier, was also regarded as inadequate. A solution was sought in the Mission Culturelle, a creation of the foreign ministry in Paris, possibly inspired by the model of the Ger-. Its task was in any case a similar one: contact with the local intelligentsia; organization of visits and speeches by prominent figures from France e.
Established in the fall of , the Mission Culturelle was the first organization of its type in which the Allies presented themselves to the Germans not as victors but as bearers of culture. When at the end of the Americans and English banned the organization Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands Cultural League for the Democratic Revival of Germany , the French did not join them because, as Lusset's superior in the foreign ministry had said a year before, they saw in institutions like the Kulturbund the greatest possibility "for developing our influence in Berlin on cultural directives.
The English moved into their sector under completely different conditions. Their self-assurance as victors was unbroken. And of all four Allies, they were the most experienced in the control of foreign peoples. Two centuries of empire had produced a colonial know-how and a well-trained administrative bureaucracy regarded with envy by their allies and respect by the Germans. Reeducation meant for the English something different than it did for the Americans. They were not guided by thoughts of an idealistic moral mission but by the conviction, confirmed through long experience, "that by educating the elite of their subject peoples into British ways, from cricket to the rule of law, they were able to maintain their rule by indirect control rather than by the more costly and troublesome overtly military-administrative direct methods of control.
They included an understanding that winning over the intelligentsia of a European country required different methods than those applied in Africa and India.
The emphasis of English cultural policy fell less on artistic and intellectual production. The missionary zeal and moral rigor of American reeducation policies, like the behavior of the Red Army during the conquest of Berlin, belong to the commonplaces of German postwar history. They are correct, but upon careful examination they thwart certain common assumptions. Thus in Europe it has been little noted that the American treatment of postwar Germany presented in essential points a repetition of what eighty years previously the victorious Union had conferred upon the defeated South after the Civil War.
What took place in Germany in the years after had taken place once before in postbellum America, from the idea of unconditional surrender to the military occupation, the installation of a military government, and the attempt through reeducation morally to improve the subject population. The methods in both campaigns were alike insofar as the population to be reeducated was not believed capable of the strength required for self-purification. Salvation had to be forced upon it. Not altogether absent were critical voices within the American military administration, like that of the Harvard political scientist Carl J.
Friedrich, who stated retrospectively: "Indifferent to or unaware of the strength of anti-Nazism inside Germany, American policy makers imposed on the Germans a totalitarian regime, more benevolent, to be sure, than that of the Nazis but giving little consideration to the best in German tradition and to the legitimate wishes of those men and women who had not accepted totalitarian methods. Clay, felt similarly: "I do not deem it necessary for a Ministry of Propaganda to be established for such controls," he informed his head of Information Control, General Robert McClure, who held a fundamentally different view of the Germans.https://senjouin-renkai.com/wp-content/software/samsung-telefon-orten.php
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Given the difference of opinions at the highest level of American military government, it was significant that among the specialists em-. McClure sought to rid himself of this bequest of the Psychological Warfare Division, out of whose personnel Information Control was formed in the summer of , arguing that "in a country which has been as anti-Semitic as Germany the reaction to some of these people has not been favorable, while on the other hand, as with Americans of any religious faith, many are starry-eyed crusaders and in some cases, therefore, unreliable.
Many of them had been born and grown up in Berlin. They encountered antifascist German intellectuals daily, resuming contact with old friends and former colleagues. And they soon came to acquire an understanding for the survivors of Nazism and a caution in criticizing and condemning far removed from McClure's rigor. Of the four occupying powers in charge of rebuilding Berlin's culture, the Russians were first in every respect. In the two months of their undivided sovereignty in May and June of , they laid the foundations and set the stage for all future activity. Their Allied partners arriving in July could question, accept, or undo what was done; but what was done, at any rate, would have to be dealt with.
The second reason for the success of Russian cultural policy was the liberalism and pragmatism with which they set about achieving it. Their strategy of "opening up instead of restricting" roused the soul—as Peter de Mendelssohn stated not without envy.
A third factor was the close collaboration with the communist intelligentsia, both at the level of the party apparatus and with individual intellectuals and artists. Since the most active part of the intelligentsia in Berlin, as in all of Europe, inclined to communism in , the Russians had at their disposal a circle of highly qualified collaborators, unlike any other occupying power. Finally, in the concurrent judgment of all who dealt with them, Russian cultural officers were themselves highly qualified intellectuals.
Berlin memoirs are replete with anecdotes like that of a Russian officer shaming his German listeners with long citations from Heine's Winterreise and the Nibelungenlied. The question asked by Western Allies and Germans in , and ever since by students of postwar history, is, of course: Why should the same power that under Stalin had visited upon its own country a Gleichschaltung of art and intellect so rigorous and without consideration of losses confer such generous treatment upon a subjugated foe?
There is still no satisfactory answer to this. Given the poor state of provisions, did the Russians, as has been supposed, resort to the old motto circuses instead of bread? Did they hope to win over artists and intellectuals to their politics with a kind of Brechtian Tui breadbasket?
Or was the cultural pluralism they fostered in Berlin perhaps the result of a quasi-conspiratorial activity of Russian intellectuals in uniform who, at a safe distance from Stalin, Zhdanov, and Beria, thought they could do what was unthinkable in Moscow?
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Was the situation of the Russian cultural officers in Berlin comparable to that of the German officers in Paris in the years —44? He controlled the Soviet Occupied Zone's political activities—of course not by himself, but in the relay of decisions made in Moscow. It remains largely unexplained which persons and groups in Moscow were behind these policies and against whom they were directed. According to a more recent interpretation, Tulpanov was more powerful than Vladimir Semjonov, also a political adviser to the SBZ, because the latter was subordinate to a merely state authority, the foreign ministry, whereas Tulpanov had a direct line to the party.
This would explain his unusually self-confident, even imperious behavior with SMAD members of higher rank. According to this study, he had "high-placed protectors" in the party who supported him until against numerous attacks from other party circles. There is much to suggest that Tulpanov was at the fore of the famous and much speculated constellation of both competing Soviet-German lines—the Stalinist line Zhdanov, Ulbricht and the laissez-fairelaissez-passer line Beria, Malenkov.
Yet these sentences bear a different reading as well: as the expression of a secret nostalgia for an irrecoverable past, the period of Tulpanov's generation's artistic and intellectual freedom, which might now perhaps be recovered in occupied Germany. East German liberal cultural historians tend toward the latter interpretation;  their West German counterparts, pointing to the unremitting political control over such "outposts," regard it as improbable.
The matter becomes entirely confusing in view of a recent "revisionist" assessment of Zhdanov. According to this, the Soviet Union's most famous Gleichschalter of culture was in reality a reformer fighting for greater openness whose cultural battle "appears to have been more a function of political maneuvering than an expression of ideological principle In fact, Zhdanov was neither as dogmatic nor as chauvinistic as his reputation suggests.
He did not seek to impose narrow ideological constraints in fields such as philosophy and natural science, but in fact resisted dogmatism and encouraged creativity in these disciplines. Culture was attacked and took the blow.